ABSTRACT: A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter -or abstain from entering -into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals' expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians' expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians' human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.
Introduction
Following Besley's (2005) pioneering study, economists have in recent years increased their interest in, and understanding of, the mechanisms driving political (self-)selection. An important topic thereby concerns the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter -or abstain from entering -into politics (and/or be selected as candidates by political parties).
Previous work in this developing literature indicates that politicians' remuneration and the degree of electoral competition can be important drivers in the political selection process. For instance, Galasso and Nannicini (2011) show that electoral competition increases parties' incentives to select better candidates, while Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) find that higher wages tend to attract better educated individuals into politics. Besides these financial and political factors, the institutional framework of elections has also been found to play a critical role in modifying individuals' expected payoffs and, in turn, political selection. or join the private sector (where wages reflect individuals' ability). In the second stage, elected politicians might direct a lump sum transfer to organized crime, which can use bribes and/or punishments to obtain such transfers. A central prediction of the model is that politically active criminal organizations reduce politicians' expected payoffs independent of individuals' decisions to accept bribes (and paying the cost of corruption), or reject them (and face punishment by the criminal organization).
1 Consequently, higher ability individuals will self-select into private sector jobs rather than take up public office (for further details, see Dal
Bó et al. 2006; Daniele and Geys 2015).
The key contribution of this article lies in an empirical assessment of this theoretical prediction -i.e. politically active criminal organizations affect political (self-)selection by leading to an equilibrium outcome with lower-ability politicians taking office. immediately follows a political murder and does not arise from any already decreasing trend in politicians' ability in such municipalities. The observed effect is not only statistically significant, but also substantively large (i.e. up to 50% of a standard deviation in first-time politicians' average education level). Interestingly, the impact of a political murder on political selection is not contained to the municipality where a murder takes place, but also extends to neighbouring municipalities. Particularly, first-time politicians' average education level in neighbouring municipalities shows a statistically significant decline after a political murder, which is about 30% of the effect uncovered in a municipality with a murder. Overall, these findings not only confirm that criminal organizations may distort the political selection process by inducing the (s)election of lower-ability politicians within and beyond the 2 It might also be that politicians already in office at the time of the murder are less affected by a change in political payoffs, since a hypothetical switch from politics to another sector might be costly. We will return to this in more detail below. In an important extension to our main analysis, we finally illustrate that these results are unlikely to be driven by a change in the "demand side" (i.e. a change in voters' behaviour), and thus most likely reflect "supply side" decisions of the politicians themselves. Such demand side effects might arise if a political murder moves voters towards parties at the extremes of the political spectrum, which, in turn, might select less educated politicians. Our results indicate, however, that i) voters do not appear to change their voting patterns following a political murder, and ii) the findings are unchanged when controlling for the political party in power.
In Section 2, we present a brief description of the institutional framework, including descriptive statistics on politicians murdered by organized crime. Section 3 discusses our empirical approach, and assesses the hypothesised negative link between politically active organized crime and politicians' ability using mafia-murdered politicians as a source of identification. Section 4 provides a concluding discussion. 
Institutional Background

Mafia-related murders
Empirical Analysis
Estimation Strategy
As explained above, we expect mafia-related murders of a politician to induce a negative shock in individuals' expected payoffs from entering politics, which leads to a decrease in the average education level of politicians elected after the murder. Our empirical analysis to verify this hypothesis relies on a difference-in-difference approach comparing municipalities with/without a politician murdered before/after a murder, thereby focusing on municipalities in Sicily, Calabria and Campania in the period 1985-2012. 3 In our specification, we consider only electoral years since the political selection process works through elections. Yet, given the quasi-randomly distributed five-year electoral cycle across Italian municipalities (see above), each year in our sample has a substantial number of municipal elections taking place.
The baseline specification is:
Where i refers to municipality and t to year. Y measures local politicians' ability level via the average educational attainment among first-time elected politicians in municipality i at the end of a certain electoral year. Specifically, following De Paola and Scoppa (2010) and
Daniele and Geys (2015), we measure education as the minimum number of years necessary to obtain a certain degree (i.e. no education = 0 years; primary education = 5 years; lower secondary = 8 years; higher secondary = 13 years; university or more = 18 years). The data on politicians' education are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Interior.
Our main explanatory variable, AfterMurder, is an indicator variable set to one in municipalities hit by a murder only in the years after the murder (0 otherwise). Specifically, we focus on the next 10 years following a murder (i.e. the two following electoral rounds).
To control for potential sources of heterogeneity across municipalities, we introduce municipality fixed effects ( ). We also include year fixed effects ( ) to control for time varying changes common to all municipalities. Furthermore, we introduce municipality-level time-varying variables to control for important socio-economic changes over the period of our analysis: i.e. population size, unemployment rate and the share of citizens with a university degree. As those variables are collected at the municipality level every ten years, we linearly interpolate them to obtain yearly observations (specifically, we use data from
Italian census in 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011) . Finally, in some specifications, we furthermore introduce province-year fixed effects. This allows controlling for time-varying changes, which might take place at the provincial level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
Main results
Our main results regarding the impact of a political murder by criminal organizations on the average education level of first-time politicians elected after this murder took place are summarized in table 1. The top panel includes the entire sample. In the bottom panel, we again consider the entire sample, but now introduce separate indicator variables for elections taking place more or less than five years after a murder: i.e., 1_to_5_AftMurder equals one only for the period within five years after the murder (0 otherwise), while 6_to_10_AftMurder equals one only for the period longer than five years after the murder (0 otherwise). In most cases, there is only one election in these five year periods (since elections generally take place every five years). However, in some cases the early dissolution of the city council can lead to multiple elections in a five year period. In such cases, we include politicians elected for the first time during both these elections in our estimate sample.
Columns 1 through 4 differ only in terms of the exact specification employed. In column 1, we exclude municipality-level time-varying controls as well as province-year fixed effects.
Columns 2 and 3 include one of these sets of variables, while column (4) presents our most complete specification with municipality-level time-varying controls and province-year fixed effects. Finally, in column (5) of each panel, we replicate the model of column (4) including in the sample only municipalities where a murder took place. Although this drastically reduces our sample, it represents a very strict test as the control group includes only municipalities where a murder will take place, at some point, in the future.
_______________________ Table 1 Clearly, it is important to verify at this point that the drop in first-time politicians' human capital follows a political murder rather than reflects an already declining trend in education levels in the affected municipalities. To test this, we check for the presence of a decreasing trend in first-time politicians' education levels before the political murder takes place.
Specifically, table 2 replicates the estimation model presented in the top panel of table 1, except that we now focus on the period before the murder. That is, we introduce indicator variables equal to 1 only in the five years before a murder (5_to_1_BefMurder; 0 otherwise) or in the six to ten years before a murder (10_to_6_BefMurder; 0 otherwise). The former generally corresponds to the last election before the murder, while the latter looks one election further into the past. Absence of a declining trend in education levels prior to a mafia-related political murder would be reflected in an insignificant difference between the coefficient estimates of both variables.
_______________________ Table 2 about here
_______________________
The results from Table 2 Moreover, since the bottom panel of table 1 indicates a significant degree of persistence beyond the first election after a political murder, the group of affected first-time politicians will be even higher. Even so, one might wonder to what extent our results likewise arise when considering the average human capital of the entire group of elected politicians.
Assuming that switching to another sector is costly once individuals have invested in a political career, politicians already in office at the time of the murder could be less affected by a change in political payoffs (see also note 2). To assess this, we replicate the analysis in the top panel of Table 1 using the average education level of all elected politicians (rather than first-time politicians) as the dependent variable. politicians. This is in line with the idea that a political murder has a stronger impact on the expected payoffs from political office among individuals who have not yet entered into politics (compared to those already in office).
Spillover Effects
So far, our interest has been limited to documenting political selection effects within the municipality where a mafia-related political murder occurred. Prospective politicians in these municipalities are clearly most directly affected by a political murder, and changes in individuals' expected payoffs from a political career will therefore be largest within the affected municipality. Nevertheless, since the average municipality in southern Italy is fairly small (i.e. less than 4000 inhabitants), travel distances are limited and the presence of criminal organizations is widespread across Southern Italian regions, we might expect the effects of a political murder to 'spill over' beyond the boundaries of the affected municipality.
Citizens considering a political career might indeed take a political murder in neighbouring municipalities as a signal for the expected payoffs from politics also in their own municipality. In other words, they might infer from the occurrence of a local politician's murder nearby that such events may likewise occur with some positive probability in their own municipality.
To test this hypothesis, we again replicate the analysis in the top panel of Neighbour in order to allow for a more direct comparison of their respective effects. Before turning to the results, it should be noted that, from a methodological perspective, the existence of any such spillover effects helps rule out concerns of potential endogeneity issues in our main analysis. The reason is that a political murder in a neighbouring municipality cannot possible be ascribed to any event taking place within individuals' own municipality. 4 show that a political murder in a nearby municipality negatively affects the average education level of first-time politicians elected after this murder occurs. The drop is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level throughout all specifications, and the estimated effect size equals approximately five to six months of lower education (which is about 30% of the effect observed in a municipality hit by a political murder). The bottom panel of Table 4 confirms that, unsurprisingly, the spillover effect is substantively smaller than the main effect observed in a municipality where the murder occurs (note that the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in all cases). Nonetheless, the existence of such spillover effect per se highlights that the detrimental effects of a political murder on political selection can spread across municipal borders. Hence, criminal organizations may distort the political selection process by inducing the (s)election of lower-ability politicians both within (table 1) and beyond (table 3) the jurisdiction of their actual activity.
_______________________
Demand-vs. Supply-Side Effects
Our interpretation thus far effectively assumes that our findings are driven by a change in political selection: i.e. in the type of individuals entering in politics. We might call this the "supply side" of this market. However, changes might conceivably also take place on the "demand side": i.e. in voters' political preferences. For instance, a political murder may shift voters' preferences towards more extremist parties, which might select less educated politicians. If so, this could represent an alternative explanation for the observed drop in firsttime politicians' human capital. We assess this possibility in two ways.
First, in table 5, we replicate the analysis using the probability of observing a certain political party in power. Specifically, the dependent variable in this case in an indicator variable equal to one if a certain political party is in power in a city i in year t (0 otherwise). We thereby consider four type of parties: civic lists, centrist parties, left-wing parties and right-wing parties. The results indicate that the coefficient of interest on After Murder is not statistically significant in any specification. Therefore, there does not appear to be any observable shift in voters' political preferences following a political murder within the municipality.
_______________________ Tables 5 and 6 about here   _______________________   Second, in table 6 , we replicate the analysis in the top panel of Table 1 while 
Conclusion
A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter -or abstain from entering -into politics. In this study, using data expected payoffs, which, in turn, leads to relatively lower-ability individuals entering into politics. To strengthen our findings, we show that: i) the drop precisely follows a political murder and it is not catching up any pre-trend; ii) the results are not driven by a change in voters' behaviors as they do not change political preferences after the shock. Finally, we
show that such detrimental effects spread to nearby municipalities where the education level of first-time elected politicians are significantly reduced.
Overall, our results can be read in a pessimistic light, as we show that the mafia has a meaningful negative impact on political selection which might spread in the surrounding geographical areas. However, in a recent study, Daniele and Geys (2015) show that law enforcement might be a useful tool to reduce organized crime's influence on political selection among Southern Italian municipalities. Specifically, following a law enforcement aimed at reducing the impact of criminal organizations on politics, the average education of the elected politicians substantially increase. Therefore, it appears that individuals, when deciding to enter in politics, take into account both negative and positive changes in their expected payoffs. This should motivate further studies exploring under which circumstances political selection can be improved, as "no society can run effective public institutions while ignoring the quality of who is recruited to public office and what they stand for" (Besley, 2005, p. 58).
Pinotti, P. (2015) . LogPop, (the logarithm of the population), Per_Degree (the percentage of citizens with a university degree) and Per_Unemployment (the percentage of unemployed over the municipality population). 1_to_5_AftMurder and 6_to_10_AftMurder equal one in municipalities where a politician is murdered by organized crime in the years after the murder (=0 otherwise), respectively one to five years after the murder; five to ten years after the murder. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
